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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
ELDON E. BASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
— vs.—
UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY,
a corporation,

Case No.
8081'

Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Defendant appeals from judgment entered below on
the jury's verdict that defendant was indebted to plaintiff in a stipulated sum under an implied contract for
additional compensation for services, over and above
the compensation for such services at the rate established
by the express contract of employment between the employer and plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Eldon E. Rasmussen was hired by defendant's predecessor, Geneva Steel Company, on January
20,1947. (R. 136) On November 16,1950 he presented his
written resignation (Ex. D-17) effective at the end of that
month. (E.141)
1
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Easmussen was employed in the Company's general
offices, a unit or place of employment separate and apart
from the operating plants, mines and quarries of the
Company wherein employees are generally represented
for collective bargaining purposes by various labor organizations; these agents of course determine the rates
of compensation and other working conditions for the
employees of their bargaining units by express contracts
with the employer. (E. 78) In contrast, the basic express
contract of employment in plaintiff's case was strictly
a bilateral agreement between employer and this employee ; and all compensation under this express contract was
long since paid in due course for services performed between January 20,1947 and November 30,1950, inclusive.
(E. 139) From 275 to 300 employees were so employed
in the general offices, in contrast to some four to five
thousand in the plants. (E. 156)
Beginning in 1944 by agreement with the C.I.O. the
various subsidiaries of United States Steel began an "inequities" job evaluation program. (E. 64) In the case of
employees represented by the various unions, the union
contracts were specific as to the conduct of the job evaluation program, and set definite cut-off dates by which
time an employee must apply in writing for retroactive
pay; such pay would then become due under such application if determined to be due under the job evaluation
program, whether or not the particular employee happened to be on the payroll at the effective date of the plan.
(E. 70) The Company on its own initiative subsequent
to the completion of the job evaluation for the union
employees, likewise so provided in the case of all salaried
2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plant employees, whether or not covered by union contracts. (E. 71)
Plaintiff was employed in the Engineering Department of the general office as a power and fuel engineer.
(K. 71) In the fall of 1950 Geneva Steel Company began
a job evaluation program for its general office employees. (E. 68) It was under no obligation to do so, undertaking the project on its own initiative. (E. 78,110) This
evaluation was not completed until 1951, when its details
were announced and it was made effective June 3rd of
that year. (E, 69)
It will be recalled that plaintiff had resigned, effective December 1, 1950. (Ex. D-17, E. 141)
As to general office employees, the Company took
the position that they must be on the payroll at the
effective date of the evaluation plan in order to receive
any retroactive pay attributable to a particular job. (E.
72) Accordingly, the increases applicable to the job held
by plaintiff were not paid plaintiff, who made demand
therefor in May of 1951. (E, 138) Eefusal led to this
lawsuit, complaint being filed July 28, 1952. (E. 1)
Judgment based upon the jury's verdict for the
established amount due, if any, was entered June 2,
1953. (E. 210) This appeal was taken by defendant on
July 23, 1953 from the money judgment (E. 220), motion
for new trial having been denied June 26, 1953 (E. 221)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
There is no competent evidence that plaintiff and
defendant's predecessor entered into an implied contract to
3
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pay retroactively to its general office employees including
plaintiff, such salary differential as might be determined by
the Company's own job evaluation, regardless of whether
or not an employee should be on the payroll at the time such
retroactive pay, if any, should be determined and ordered
paid by the Company.
II.
The court erred in admitting evidence of acts by the
Company subsequent to November, 1950, by which time
plaintiff's employment had ceased.
III.
The court erred by its instruction No. 10 in permitting
the jury to consider evidence of acts of the employer subsequent to November, 1950, by which time plaintiff's employment had ceased.
ARGUMENT
I.
There is no competent evidence that plaintiff and
defendant's predecessor entered into an implied contract to
pay retroactively to its general office employees including
plaintiff, such salary differential as might be determined by
the Company's own job evaluation, regardless of whether
or not an employee should be on the payroll at the time such
retroactive pay, if any, should be determined and ordered
paid by the Company.
Plaintiff sought to establish his implied contract
upon which the judgment is based on the following evidence most favorable to plaintiff:
a. Testimony that it had been the "custom" or
"policy" of the Company on two occasions to grant to
non-union employees general increases, such as cost-of-
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living increases, at about the same time and comparable
in amount as those granted to its union employees; this
not as an obligation, but in order not to leave any group
of employees out and to treat all fairly. An example was
the testimony of James L. Dillon, former Superintendent of Industrial Eelations of the employer. (E. 61, 80, 82)
b. In addition plaintiff was permitted over objection to introduce a series of exhibits constituting various
news releases and general announcements discussing in
general terms the job evaluation program. (Exhibits P - l
to 8, inclusive.) I t is submitted that none of these are
specific or refer to the general office employees.
c. Plaintiff then established that before he had
resigned he had prepared a job description of his position in October. (Ex. P-9, E. 142) Also the obvious fact
that the employees knew an evaluation program was
under way for the general offices. (E. 77) But it was
perfectly clear that the employees did not know whether
or not there would be an effective program at all adopted
by the Company until the announcement of December 15,
1950 (Ex. D-15, D-16) And the details of the program
and the conditions whereunder it was to be applicable to
the particular employee were not established until June
1, 1951, effective June 3rd of that year. (Ex. P-12)
F o r example, Witness Sumsion for plaintiff testified
(R.133):
Q. And did you think those in the plant, that
they had a reclassification program that permitted, in some instances, men who no longer
were on the payroll at the time to get their
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retroactive pay, did you think because of that
you would be entitled to that in the general
office?
A. Let me say, I sincerely hoped so. I could not
positively say, but we all felt that way.
Q. Of couse you hoped so, but you didn't know
what the company would do, did you?
A. They stated in one bulletin there was a program under way that would include us.
Q. Now we are talking about these retroactive
payments, you didn't know what the company
would do, in respect to the program for the
general offices with relation to retroactive
pay, did you?
A. Well one could never be sure until he was
actually,—until he had received the pay, I
suppose, but we knew the program was under
way, and we all felt we would be included.
Q. The program was under way, but you didn't
know what turns it would take, did you?
A. I don't follow you exactly.
Q. On what terms the retroactive payments
would be made, you didn't know, did you?
A. Well, we knew they would be made, they
would be paid on the basis of our job descriptions, the work we were doing.
Q. But whether a man was on the payroll or not,
you didn't know whether it would have an
effect one way or the other?
A. No sir.
Q. You didn't know anything about that?
A. No.
6
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Q. You say "no"?
A. No.
Q. In the nature of things, you couldn't know
anything about it could you?
A. No sir.
Q. You got your retroactive pay?
A. Yes sir.
Q. You were on the payroll when you got it,
weren't you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. In other words, you hoped you would get it
when the program was in progress, that is all
you knew about it, isn't it?
A. Actually it probably boiled down to a hope;
coupled with the fact that we all felt we would
get in and the fact that we felt we had it
coming.
Plaintiff himself testified on direct examination (R.

Q. Did you know about the job classification program that took effect in connection with
salaried employees in the plant?
A. Yes sir, I did.
Q. Were you ever advised by the company prior
to the time you left the company, if you
expected to get your retroactive pay you
would have to be on the payroll on the effective date?
A. No sir.
7
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Q. When you anticipated leaving the company,
was anything said by anyone with reference
to retroactive pay!
A. Yes sir.
Q. Will you state by whom, when and where, and
who was present?
A. After I had submitted my resignation and
was preparing to leave, my superior, Mr.
Gaw, called me in and he told me at that time
that he did not know what effect the inequity
program would take as to my case, but I think
at that time he was trying to give me some
reasons to stay on in the employ of the company.
Also (B. 138-9):
Q.

(by Mr. Bushnell) From your testimony, you
learned a letter came out December 15th, that
is after you left?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you speak to anyone, was anything else
done with regard to retroactive pay?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What was that?
A. When I checked with the payroll department
clerk, that checked me out, took my address
and told me it was for the purpose if retroactive pay was ever made they would know
where to get in touch with me and where to
pay.
Q. Did you contact the company at any other
time with reference to retroactive pay?
A. Yes. I did.
8
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Q. When was that?
A. In May 1951,1 believe.
Q. Where did you go to see about it at that time ?
A. I stopped in Mr. Jones office, I went there
for the express purpose of submitting my
application for retroactive pay.
Q. Were you permitted to talk to Mr. Dillon!
A. No.
Q. Who did you talk to?
A. A girl in charge of his office.
Q. Tell what happened?
A. She took the information down, went in Mr.
Dillon's office, I suppose she discussed the
problem with Mr. Dillon, and came back.
ME. PARSONS: What he supposed is not relevant.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. BUSHNELL:
Q.

Strike it.

(by Mr. Bushnell) What did she say when
you came back?

A. She said I was not elegible and did not need
to submit the application.
Q. This is two or three months after you quit?
A. Yes sir.
MR. BUSHNELL: You may cross examine.
And on cross examination (R. 139):
9
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Q. No one in authority ever told you you were
going to get your retroactive pay, and your
name was not on the payroll at the time the
plan became effective, did they?
A. No sir, no one told me I wouldn't either.
Q. You were paid the full amount that you were
entitled to so far as any wages were concerned, were you not?
A. Well at the rate I was receiving at that time,
in anticipation of inequity, I would say I was
paid at the rate that was paid for the job at
our particular plant for the particular job
at that particular time.
Of course, we always anticipated the fact
we might get inequity, and it would cover the
same period covered for hourly workers, with
which I was familiar.
Q. You hoped you would?
A. I thought I would, yes, because it was the
custom of the company to always treat their
salaried employees as good, if not better.
Q. Aside from that, when you left, you had been
paid in full, hadn't you?
A. Yes sir.
Finally, on page 141 of the record:
Q.

(by Mr. Parsons) You have used the word
"custom" or "practice" what do you mean by
those words?

A. Well, where ever benefits were given to one
group of employees, such as those covered by
the bargaining units of which there are two
groups, the company has always, as far as I
know, came — gave similar benefits to the
10
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salaried employees, at least of the non-exempt
salaried employees of which I was one.
Q.

Really that is the sum and substance of your
position, isn't it?

A. Well, I believe it is.
MR. P A R S O N S : That is all.
(1) In the first place, this evidence, selected as that
most favorable to plaintiff, would appear to fall far
short of that required to establish mutual assent to the
promises of a contract. As set forth in Section 5 of the
Restatement of Contracts, "a promise in a contract must
be stated in such words either oral or written, or must
be inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies the promisee in understanding that the promisor
intended to make a promise".
The familiar illustrations of promises so implied are
given as follows:
1. A telephones to his grocer, "Send me a
barrel of flour." The grocer sends i t A has
thereby contracted to pay a reasonable price
therefor.
2. A, on passing a market, where he has an
account, sees a box of apples marked "5 cts. each."
A picks up an apple, holds it up so that a clerk
of the establishment sees the act. The clerk nods,
and A passes on. A has contracted to pay five
cents for the apple.
(2) Secondly, the requirement of certainty is not
met. Section 32 of the Restatement sets forth this
requirement in the following language:
11
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§ 32. REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY IN
THE TERMS OF AN OFFER.
An offer must be so definite in its terms, or
require such definite terms in the acceptance, that
the promises and performances to be rendered by
each party are reasonably certain.
Comment:
a. Inasmuch as the law of contracts deals only
with duties defined by the expressions of the
parties, the rule stated in the Section is one of
necessity as well as of law. The law cannot subject a person to a contractual duty or give another a contractual right unless the character
thereof is fixed by the agreement of the parties.
A statement by A that he will pay B what A
chooses is no promise. A promise by A to give
B employment is not wholly illusory, but if neither
the character of the employment nor the compensation therefor is stated, the promise is so indefinite that the law cannot enforce it, even if consideration is given for it.
b. Promises may be indefinite in time or in
place, or in the work or things to be given in
exchange for the promise. In dealing with such
cases the law endeavors to give a sufficiently clear
meaning to offers and promises where the parties
intended to enter into a bargain, but in some
cases this is impossible.
c. Offers which are originally too indefinite
may later acquire precision and become valid
offers, by the subsequent words or acts of the
offeror or his assent to words or acts of the offeree.
With respect to comment "c", such occurrences in
this case did not take place until after plaintiff had
resigned, supra.
12
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An apt illustration is cited from page 42, under this
section :
6. A promises B to sell to him and B promises A to buy of him goods "at cost plus a nice
profit/' The promise is too indefinite to form a
contract.
Construing the evidence in this ease most favorably
for plaintiff, Geneva at best promised to pay Easmussen
X dollars per month. True, there was a hope for more;
more had been granted other groups. But as to the general office employees, including plaintiff, no one in authority had ever announced during plaintiff's period of
employment whether or not such a retroactive pay plan
would ever be adopted, or if so, on what conditions, supra.
This announcement did not come until December 15,
1950 and later; and by then plaintiff was no longer an
employee so could not assent to such a promise or extend
any consideration therefor.
Not only was the $64 question unannounced — if
there would be a plan at all; but such details as the
retroactive date, the amounts, the cut-off dates, the
effective dates, and who should be qualified under the
plan — all were as wide open as the sky. Not until
December 15,1950 — fifteen days after the effective date
of plaintiff's voluntary resignation — did the President
of the Company announce through Exhibits D-15 and
D-16 that there would be any plan at all for the general
office employees. This first official announcement was
made in these words:
SUBJECT: Salary Adjustment for Nonexempt
13
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Salaried Employees (Except those Employed
within the Geneva and Ironton Plants)
Effective December 1, 1950, the nonexempt
salaried employees within your department receive an increase of $22 per month.
A program for the description, job classification, and establishment of a standard salary
scale for nonexempt salaried jobs (except those
within the Geneva and Ironton Plants, where a
like program has been completed) is presently
under way and will be completed as soon as possible. Upon completion of the program, any
adjustment in salary resulting therefrom will be
adjusted from March 9, 1947 forward for all nonexempt salaried employees who are on the payroll
the date the standard salary scale is made effective.
Will you please advise nonexempt salaried
personnel within your department, whose salary
rates will be adjusted as shown above.
Not until the following June were the details perfected and the plan announced as effective June 3, 1951
(Ex. P-12); but by then plaintiff was long since gone
by his own choice.
(3) Finally, this situation is not unlike the "bonus"
situations concerning which some comparable cases have
been decided by courts of sister jurisdictions. These are
annotated in 28 A.L.E. 346; and such cases as Haag v.
Eogers, (1911) (Ga.) 72 S.E. 46, makes it clear that
voluntary termination of employment before the time
specified in the employer's offer results in forfeiture of
the bonus or retroactive pay because of failure of performance on the part of the employee.
14
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Reference is also made to the case of Pyeatt v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co. (N. Mex. 1950), 213 P. 2d 436.
There the court denied recovery to employees who had
quit before the effective date of a retroactive wage
increase. The employer had announced his intention of
seeking War Labor Board approval of such a plan; but
the Board then disapproved the proposals, following
which the employees voluntarily terminated their services. Subsequently the Board modified its position and
a plan was made effective, but not as to plaintiffs. The
court there referred to the bonus case rule, affirming the
employer's position, stating that if the employee 'Voluntarily terminates his services before the bonus is payable
he is not entitled to it."
A fortiori here, where plaintiff quit work voluntarily
before any offer at all had as yet been made by Geneva.
The court below accordingly erred when it denied
defendant's motion for a directed verdict (R. 147); and
failed to grant judgment for defendant notwithstanding
the verdict. (R. 221)
II.
The court erred in admitting evidence of acts by the
Company subsequent to November, 1950, by which time
plaintiff's employment had ceased.
III.
The court erred by its instruction No. 10 in permitting
the jury to consider evidence of acts of the employer subsequent to November, 1950, by which time plaintiff's employment had ceased.
15
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These two points are argued together, since the net
result was to place before the jury for consideration
evidence not applicable to plaintiff's contract of employment — whatever it was — since he had quit.
As pointed out above, plaintiff voluntarily terminated his employment effective at the end of November,
1950, at which time no offer of retroactive pay had been
made; it was then not known if there would be a plan
for the general office employees at all, or the terms
thereof if such a plan w l e r e to be effected.
The court below had correctly ruled on several occasions (e.g., R. 5) and in his other instructions that the
employment contract was to be determined from facts
and circumstances during the period of plaintiff's service, i.e., from J a n u a r y 20, 1947 to December 1, 1950.
(R. 199, 200) Then, on the theory that such evidence
might indicate "if the defendant company intended to
follow the usual practice and procedure, if any, with
reference to salaries paid to different groups of
employees of the defendant company" (R, 201), the court
proceeded to admit evidence of acts and statements of
the Company done or made after December 1, 1950; and
by its instruction No. 10 permitted the jury to consider
such evidence for the purpose quoted above.
This evidence consisted of such items as the news
release of the retroactive pay plan as finally announced
affecting the general office employees (Ex. P - 7 ) ; a letter of April 2,1951 to the Government requesting authority to adopt such a plan (Ex. P - 8 ) ; the job description
(Ex. P-9) and job classification (Ex. P-10) adopted for
16
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the position which plaintiff had formerly held; a tentative study as to Rasinussen upon which the amount due,
if any, was stipulated (Ex. P - l l ) ; the plan as finally
promulgated by the employer June 1, 1951 (Ex. P-12);
and a somewhat comparable plan of another subsidiary,
the United States Steel Corporation of Delaware (Ex.
P-13).
A great variety of oral testimony was required to
identify and explain these various exhibits, including
that of Dillon (R. 84-88); Friedley (R, 88-93-5); and
Heald (R. 57). Much of this testimony involved argument and explanation as to the exact background, construction and meaning of Exhibit 12 — the announcement
of the plan effective June 3, 1951, including its effect on
pregnant women (R. 157), although plaintiff had long
before departed at the end of November, 1950 (R. 41).
All of this redundant and irrelevant material could
not help but prejudice the jury, which under the confusion compounded reacted about as might have been
expected. For this reason alone the judgment should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION

This appeal really involves nothing more than an
elementary review of some fundamentals of the law of
contracts, agency and evidence, and the application of
these hornbook rules to the facts of this case :
1. A contract is a promise or set of promises
(Restatement of Contracts, §1) which must be stated
in such words either oral or written, or must be inferred
17
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wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies the
promisee in understanding that the promisor intended to
make a promise (Restatement, §5), and must be so
definite in its terms that the promises and performances
to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain
(Restatement, §32).
2. Evidence must be relevant and material (Model
Code of Evidence, Rules 1 and 9). In the absence of
such evidence to support the necessary elements of plaintiff's case, of course there can be no recovery.
3. To bind the corporate employer, the promise
must be made by agents acting within the scope of their
authority (Restatement of Agency, §12).
4. Plaintiff's case requires competent proof that
defendant's predecessor promised him as a consideration
for his services that in addition to the expaw* rate of
pay, he would be given retroactive pay under a job
evaluation program, whether or not plaintiff was still
employed at the time such plan was to be made effective.
Search as we must throughout the record — including the 50-page Exhibit 14, and selecting and construing
as again we must, all that is most favorable to plaintiff,
we respectfully submit that nothing of substance can be
discovered other than, in the words of plaintiff himself
(R. 139), an anticipation or hope that such a result as
he now claims might eventually be effected by the
employer. But necessarily — since such a promise was
never made, but in fact was denied during the employ18
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ment period (R. 139), such hope or anticipation would
come, if ever, as a matter of grace; and not pursuant to
a contractual right enforceable at law.
To illustrate the remaining two points on this appeal,
we ask the court to review briefly Exhibit P-14? the
"United States Steel News" of July, 1950. On page 33
will be found an article about the performance of a contract between the C.I.O. and various companies other
than Geneva Steel. Admittedly if plaintiff had read this
article, he might well have entertained some hope, as
have members of the Utah Judiciary over the years, for
ultimate salary increases.
As applied to this case, we respectfully submit that
the only relevant portion of Exhibit 14 would be the
article on page 41 on Mrs. Geneva Steele with its heading
"Confusion, Confusion and More Confusion."
There was not only the absence of competent proof
in this case to support a promise by the employer; but
such a wealth of immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent
exhibits and testimony that it could not escape confusing
the jury to the prejudice of defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PARSONS,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
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